hello's fingerprint-bound signature was the actual gate for `verified`
on both the CLI and PWA, and dtlsFP() only ever parses sha-256
fingerprints. Different WebRTC stacks report the DTLS cert hash under
different algorithms (WebKit: sha-512, pion/Chromium: sha-256), so a
legitimate cross-stack peer could never produce a verifiable hello —
degrading to permanently "unverified", or on the Go side, never
sending hello at all. Matches an interop gotcha waste-go's yaw2 docs
recently called out explicitly.
Real authentication already happens over the sealed signaling channel
during the ekey exchange (crypto.Verify), same as waste-go. Added
peerAuthed to the Go session (mirroring the PWA's existing field),
set once a sealed box from the peer opens successfully, and gate
`verified` on peerAuthed + hello.id matching instead. The fingerprint
signature is still sent/checked when both sides have a parseable
fingerprint, but only logged on mismatch — never blocking.
No behavior change for today's pion<->Chromium pairings (both sha-256).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Watches local directories and auto-pushes new/changed files to a
known daemon peer via fsnotify, with startup reconciliation, a
stable_after debounce, and per-file JSON state so failed sends retry
on the next connection. Multiple watch entries targeting the same
peer share a single connection/room (watchPeerGroup), resolving the
room-name-collision question flagged in PROPOSAL-watch.md. Push-only,
never propagates deletes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
