Resolve open design questions: write-scoped grants, rollback, purge

Per-question resolution, per best practice rather than deferral:

- Push authorization: closed the least-privilege gap where read implied
  write. vault_grants gained can_write (default true, so nothing
  existing changes); enforced on push and grant (granting others is
  itself a mutation of vault membership, so it needs write too, not
  just read). 'keep grant --read-only' creates a read-only grant.

- Version history: not full history (conflates "undo a typo'd push"
  with "this leaked, stop retaining it" into one mechanism). Retains
  exactly one previous version as a rollback safety net
  (vaults.prev_ciphertext/prev_nonce + a vault_grants_previous mirror
  table so recipients can unwrap it), plus 'keep push --purge' for
  compromise-driven rotations that explicitly skips retention and
  wipes any existing previous version too.

- Per-secret-key granularity: resolved by NOT building it — documented
  the escape hatch (split into more vaults) instead of adding partial-
  decrypt complexity for a problem the existing primitive solves.

One more real bug caught during verification: the CLI's --previous flag
initially signed a path including its query string, but the server
verifies against req.originalUrl with the query stripped — a mismatch
that would have made every --previous request fail signature
verification. Fixed by splitting the signed path from the request URL
in signedFetch, signing only the former.

Verified end-to-end with three independent identities: read-only grant
correctly blocked from push and from granting others, write access and
read-only status both preserved correctly across a rotation, previous-
version pull working for a routine push and correctly unavailable to
every recipient after a purge push. Also re-verified against a fresh
Docker build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Fredrik Johansson
2026-07-12 19:50:08 +02:00
parent 67000b66ee
commit 001623c8e2
7 changed files with 284 additions and 101 deletions

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import {
enc,
} from '../../shared/crypto.js';
export async function vaultPush(vaultKey: string, file: string): Promise<void> {
export async function vaultPush(vaultKey: string, file: string, purge: boolean): Promise<void> {
await ready();
const { identity, recipientId } = await requireIdentityAndRecipientId();
@@ -21,8 +21,11 @@ export async function vaultPush(vaultKey: string, file: string): Promise<void> {
const existsRes = await expectOk(await signedFetch(identity, recipientId, 'GET', `/api/vaults/${encodeURIComponent(vaultKey)}/exists`));
const wrapFor = new Map<string, string>(); // recipientId -> publicKey
wrapFor.set(recipientId, identity.id);
// recipientId -> { publicKey, canWrite } — canWrite is preserved across
// a rotation, not reset, so pushing an update never silently changes
// who else can write vs. only read.
const wrapFor = new Map<string, { publicKey: string; canWrite: boolean }>();
wrapFor.set(recipientId, { publicKey: identity.id, canWrite: true });
if (existsRes.exists) {
const recipientsRes = await signedFetch(identity, recipientId, 'GET', `/api/vaults/${encodeURIComponent(vaultKey)}/recipients`);
@@ -30,32 +33,34 @@ export async function vaultPush(vaultKey: string, file: string): Promise<void> {
const body = await recipientsRes.json().catch(() => ({}));
throw new Error(body.error ?? `no access to vault '${vaultKey}' — ask an existing grantee to run 'keep grant ${vaultKey} ${recipientId}'`);
}
const current = await recipientsRes.json() as { recipientId: string; publicKey: string }[];
for (const r of current) if (r.publicKey) wrapFor.set(r.recipientId, r.publicKey);
const current = await recipientsRes.json() as { recipientId: string; publicKey: string; canWrite: boolean }[];
for (const r of current) if (r.publicKey) wrapFor.set(r.recipientId, { publicKey: r.publicKey, canWrite: r.canWrite });
}
const symmetricKey = generateSymmetricKey();
const { nonce, ciphertext } = secretboxEncrypt(symmetricKey, payload);
const wrappedKeys: Record<string, string> = {};
for (const [rid, pubHex] of wrapFor) {
wrappedKeys[rid] = enc.toBase64(Identity.sealFor(pubHex, symmetricKey));
const wrappedKeys: Record<string, { wrappedKey: string; canWrite: boolean }> = {};
for (const [rid, { publicKey, canWrite }] of wrapFor) {
wrappedKeys[rid] = { wrappedKey: enc.toBase64(Identity.sealFor(publicKey, symmetricKey)), canWrite };
}
await expectOk(await signedFetch(identity, recipientId, 'POST', `/api/vaults/${encodeURIComponent(vaultKey)}/push`, {
ciphertext: enc.toBase64(ciphertext),
nonce: enc.toBase64(nonce),
wrappedKeys,
purge,
}));
console.log(`pushed '${vaultKey}' — ${Object.keys(values).length} key${Object.keys(values).length === 1 ? '' : 's'}, wrapped for ${wrapFor.size} recipient${wrapFor.size === 1 ? '' : 's'}.`);
console.log(`pushed '${vaultKey}' — ${Object.keys(values).length} key${Object.keys(values).length === 1 ? '' : 's'}, wrapped for ${wrapFor.size} recipient${wrapFor.size === 1 ? '' : 's'}${purge ? ' (purged previous version)' : ''}.`);
}
export async function vaultPull(vaultKey: string, format: 'env' | 'json', outFile?: string): Promise<void> {
export async function vaultPull(vaultKey: string, format: 'env' | 'json', outFile: string | undefined, previous: boolean): Promise<void> {
await ready();
const { identity, recipientId } = await requireIdentityAndRecipientId();
const data = await expectOk(await signedFetch(identity, recipientId, 'GET', `/api/vaults/${encodeURIComponent(vaultKey)}/pull`));
const query = previous ? '?previous=1' : '';
const data = await expectOk(await signedFetch(identity, recipientId, 'GET', `/api/vaults/${encodeURIComponent(vaultKey)}/pull${query}`));
const symmetricKey = identity.openSealed(enc.fromBase64(data.wrappedKey));
if (!symmetricKey) throw new Error('failed to unwrap this vault\'s key — wrong identity, or the grant is stale');
@@ -66,13 +71,13 @@ export async function vaultPull(vaultKey: string, format: 'env' | 'json', outFil
const out = format === 'json' ? JSON.stringify(values, null, 2) : serializeEnv(values);
if (outFile) {
fs.writeFileSync(outFile, out);
console.error(`wrote ${Object.keys(values).length} key(s) to ${outFile}`);
console.error(`wrote ${Object.keys(values).length} key(s) to ${outFile}${previous ? ' (previous version)' : ''}`);
} else {
process.stdout.write(out);
}
}
export async function vaultGrant(vaultKey: string, targetRecipientId: string): Promise<void> {
export async function vaultGrant(vaultKey: string, targetRecipientId: string, readOnly: boolean): Promise<void> {
await ready();
const { identity, recipientId } = await requireIdentityAndRecipientId();
@@ -88,15 +93,16 @@ export async function vaultGrant(vaultKey: string, targetRecipientId: string): P
await expectOk(await signedFetch(identity, recipientId, 'POST', `/api/vaults/${encodeURIComponent(vaultKey)}/grant`, {
recipientId: targetRecipientId,
wrappedKey,
canWrite: !readOnly,
}));
console.log(`granted '${vaultKey}' to ${targetRecipientId}.`);
console.log(`granted ${readOnly ? 'read-only ' : ''}'${vaultKey}' access to ${targetRecipientId}.`);
}
export async function vaultRevoke(vaultKey: string, targetRecipientId: string): Promise<void> {
await expectOk(await adminFetch('DELETE', `/api/admin/vaults/${encodeURIComponent(vaultKey)}/grants/${encodeURIComponent(targetRecipientId)}`));
console.log(`revoked ${targetRecipientId}'s access to '${vaultKey}'.`);
console.log(`Note: this stops future pulls only. If this was a compromise response, also run 'keep push ${vaultKey}' with rotated values.`);
console.log(`Note: this stops future pulls only. If this was a compromise response, also run 'keep push ${vaultKey} --purge' with rotated values.`);
}
export async function vaultLog(vaultKey: string): Promise<void> {