fix: stop leaking TURN secret to browser clients
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Build / Build & release (push) Successful in 13m40s
WASTE_CONFIG.turnSecret was shipped in plaintext config.js and used to compute coturn HMAC credentials client-side in browser.ts. Anyone reading the PWA's JS could read the secret and mint unlimited long-lived TURN credentials, turning the relay into an open proxy. The anchor now mints short-lived (1h) credentials server-side via a new GET /turn-credentials endpoint (-turn-secret flag), mirroring what the daemon already does. The browser fetches credentials instead of holding the secret. Daemon mode was unaffected (already server-side). Docs updated to drop turnSecret from config.js examples, document the new nginx route, and instruct anyone with an old config.js to rotate the coturn secret since it was previously exposed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -6,12 +6,17 @@ package main
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha1"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"flag"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"sync"
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"time"
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@@ -23,16 +28,40 @@ import (
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func main() {
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bind := flag.String("bind", "0.0.0.0:17339", "address to listen on")
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turnSecret := flag.String("turn-secret", "", "coturn use-auth-secret shared secret; enables GET /turn-credentials")
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flag.Parse()
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a := newAnchor()
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http.HandleFunc("/ws", a.handleWS)
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if *turnSecret != "" {
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http.HandleFunc("/turn-credentials", turnCredentialsHandler(*turnSecret))
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log.Printf("anchor: /turn-credentials enabled")
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}
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log.Printf("anchor: listening on %s", *bind)
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if err := http.ListenAndServe(*bind, nil); err != nil {
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log.Fatalf("anchor: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// turnCredentialsHandler mints short-lived coturn use-auth-secret credentials
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// server-side, so the shared secret never reaches the browser. Mirrors the
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// scheme in internal/netmgr.Manager.turnICEServers (daemon mode).
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func turnCredentialsHandler(secret string) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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expiry := strconv.FormatInt(time.Now().Add(time.Hour).Unix(), 10)
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mac := hmac.New(sha1.New, []byte(secret))
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mac.Write([]byte(expiry))
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credential := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
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json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(struct {
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Username string `json:"username"`
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Credential string `json:"credential"`
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TTL int `json:"ttl"`
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}{Username: expiry, Credential: credential, TTL: 3600})
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}
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}
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// ── Anchor ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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type client struct {
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