- Signed invites: waste: URI gains inviter+sig fields (Ed25519); hello
carries the invite so receiving peers can verify against known keys
- RequireInvite per-network flag: rejects peers without valid signed invite
- Hash-based hang links: #waste:base64 fragment pre-fills join form without
server-side leakage of network name
- Multi-share: shares.json (daemon) + waste_shares localStorage (browser);
IPC add_share/remove_share/list_shares commands
- EXTENSIONS.md: addendum documenting all waste-go protocol deviations from
YAW/2; all extensions are additive and backward compatible
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Committed a generated hex string that looked like a real secret.
Replaced with YOUR_SECRET_HERE to make it obviously an example.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace placeholder YOUR_RANDOM_SECRET with an actual openssl rand -hex 32
output, with a note to generate a fresh one. Keeps the example copy-pasteable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Browser adapter reads turnURL + turnSecret from WASTE_CONFIG and adds a
TURN ICEServer entry automatically. Uses time-limited credentials
compatible with coturn's use-auth-secret mode.
README: new section under Hosting with coturn install, turnserver.conf,
firewall note (UDP 3478, no NPM needed), and config.js snippet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Document the folder sharing, peer file browsing, and direct push (📎)
workflows added in the previous commit. Clarify that browser mode also
activates locally when config.js sets signalURL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Upgrades the signaling layer from static X25519 (2.0) to per-session
ephemeral X25519 (2.1). Recorded signaling traffic cannot be decrypted
even if long-term Ed25519 keys later leak, because esk is zeroed on
session close.
Protocol:
- Each peer generates a fresh X25519 keypair (esk/epk) per session.
- Peers exchange signed `ekey` messages sealed under static keys before
the offer/answer. Offer/answer/candidate payloads are then sealed with
ephemeral keys (crypto_box(·, peer_epk, my_esk)).
- ekey sig binds both peer IDs and the epk to prevent replay to third parties.
- Offerer waits up to 2 s for the peer's ekey; if none arrives it falls back
to YAW/2.0 static-key sealing and logs "2.0 fallback offer".
- 2.0 peers silently ignore the unknown `ekey` kind — full interop preserved.
Implementation:
- crypto.go: add EphemeralKey.PublicRaw/PrivateRaw/Wipe helpers.
- proto.go: add SigEkey kind; EPK/V/EkeySig fields on SignalingPayload.
- anchor/client.go: replace flat pcs map with peerSession struct tracking
ephemeral keys, peerEPK, and fs flag; openBoxAuto tries ephemeral then
static; sealAndSend chooses seal based on session state.
- test-network.sh: pipe daemon stderr through tee to daemon.log; add
YAW/2.1 FS verification section.
- test-tui.sh: same daemon.log capture.
- README.md: document 2.1 forward secrecy, file transfer IPC, updated roadmap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- IPC examples now show correct ChatMessage shape (mid, to, sent_at),
DM syntax, generate_invite command, and all event types
- New Onboarding section shows the Alice→Bob invite flow end-to-end
- TUI options table: add -join flag
- TUI key bindings: add ctrl+i and Esc
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Connects to a running daemon's IPC port on startup
- Sends join_network then get_state; listens for events in real time
- Three-pane layout: room list (left), message history (centre), peers (right)
- Tab/Shift+Tab to switch rooms, Enter to send, PgUp/PgDn to scroll
- DM rooms appear automatically when a DM arrives
- test-tui.sh boots the full stack (anchor + 3 peers) and opens the TUI
as alice, with bob and charlie sending periodic messages as live noise
- README: layout diagram, key bindings, TUI section; roadmap item marked done
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
