# waste-go Protocol Extensions These are additive extensions to [YAW/2](PROTOCOL.md) implemented by waste-go. They do **not** break compatibility — YAW/2-only peers silently ignore all new fields. Where a waste-go peer connects to a YAW/2-only peer, the extension simply has no effect on that peer. --- ## EXT-001 — Signed Invites **Status:** implemented **Affects:** `waste:` invite format, `hello` DataChannel message ### Motivation The base YAW/2 network model is open to anyone who knows the anchor URL and network name (or hash). This extension adds opt-in cryptographic membership gating: invites are signed by an existing peer, and peers that enforce `RequireInvite` reject hellos that carry no valid signed invite. ### Invite format changes The `waste:` invite payload (base64-encoded JSON) gains two optional fields: ```json { "anchor": "wss://...", "network": "friends", "net": "<64-hex SHA-256(yaw2-net:name)>", "inviter": "<64-hex Ed25519 pubkey of signing peer>", "sig": "" } ``` The signature covers the following bytes (null-separated): ``` anchor \x00 network \x00 net \x00 inviter ``` Unsigned invites (`inviter`/`sig` absent) remain valid for backward compat. ### Hello message extension The YAW/2 §6 hello message gains one optional field: ```json { "type": "hello", "id": "", "nick": "alice", "caps": ["chat", "file"], "sig": "", "invite": "waste:eyJ..." } ``` `invite` carries the full `waste:` string the connecting peer used to join. YAW/2-only peers ignore this field. ### Enforcement Per-network flag `RequireInvite` (set via `join_network` IPC command). When enabled: 1. A peer that presents no `invite` in hello is disconnected immediately. 2. A peer that presents an invite with no signature is disconnected. 3. A peer whose invite signature is invalid is disconnected. 4. A peer whose invite was signed by an unknown peer ID (not in the store or currently connected) is disconnected. The inviter's key must be a **known peer** — i.e. previously connected and stored in the per-network SQLite store, or currently connected. This forms a chain of trust: Alice (founder) invites Bob; Bob's key is now known; Bob can invite Carol, whose invite Alice will also accept. **Default:** off. Networks opt in. Existing networks with no RequireInvite behave exactly as before. --- ## EXT-002 — Hash-based Hang Link **Status:** implemented **Affects:** web UI URL handling only, no wire changes ### Motivation A shareable URL that pre-fills the join form without conveying cryptographic membership. Suitable for public announcements ("come hang out here"). The fragment is never sent to the server, keeping the network name opaque to server logs and HTTP intermediaries. ### Format ``` https://host/#waste:eyJ... ``` The fragment payload is the standard `waste:` base64 JSON with only `network` and `anchor` fields — no `inviter`, no `sig`. This does **not** grant membership on networks with `RequireInvite` enabled; it only pre-fills the join form. The web UI generates hang links via the 🔗 button in the Networks sidebar section. Arriving users see the join form pre-populated and still need a proper signed invite (if the network enforces it) to be accepted by peers. --- ## EXT-003 — Multi-Share Configuration **Status:** implemented **Affects:** IPC protocol only, no peer-to-peer wire changes ### New IPC commands ```jsonc {"type":"add_share","path":"/home/alice/Music"} // global {"type":"add_share","path":"/home/alice/Docs","network_ids":["abc123"]} // scoped {"type":"remove_share","path":"/home/alice/Music"} {"type":"list_shares"} ``` ### New IPC event ```jsonc {"type":"shares_list","shares":[{"path":"...","networks":["*"]}]} ``` ### Persistence `shares.json` in the data directory (next to `identity.json`). Each entry: ```json { "path": "/absolute/path", "networks": ["*"] } ``` `networks: ["*"]` = global (all networks). Specific network IDs = scoped. Coexists with the legacy `set_share_dir` single-dir mechanism. File listings returned by `get_file_list` and `MsgFileListReq` include entries from all applicable share roots, with relative `path` fields (e.g. `"path": "docs/report.pdf"`). --- ## EXT-004 — TURN Relay (browser mode) **Status:** implemented (browser mode + daemon mode) **Affects:** ICE server configuration only, no wire changes The browser adapter reads `WASTE_CONFIG.turnURL` and fetches short-lived credentials from the anchor's `GET /turn-credentials` endpoint (derived from `WASTE_CONFIG.signalURL`, or overridden via `WASTE_CONFIG.turnCredentialsURL`). The anchor computes the credential using HMAC-SHA1 of the username (coturn `use-auth-secret` scheme) — the shared secret itself is never sent to the browser. Daemon mode does the equivalent computation locally, since the daemon already holds `-turn-secret` server-side. YAW/2 §0 explicitly declines TURN ("No relay (TURN)"). This extension is opt-in via server configuration and does not affect peers that omit it. --- ## EXT-005 — Per-Network Path in FileEntry **Status:** implemented **Affects:** `MsgFileListResp` wire message (additive field) `FileEntry` gains an optional `path` field carrying the file's relative path within its share root (e.g. `"docs/report.pdf"`). Peers that don't understand this field continue to use `name` for display and download requests. `MsgFileListReq` / `get` requests use `path` as the lookup key when present, falling back to `name` for backward compat with peers that don't send `path`. --- ## EXT-006 — File Transfer Resume **Status:** implemented (daemon mode) **Affects:** `file-accept` wire message (additive field) ### Motivation A transfer interrupted mid-stream (peer disconnect, network drop) can be continued from where it left off on the next offer of the same file, avoiding a full re-download. ### Protocol change `file-accept` gains one optional field: ```json { "type": "file-accept", "xid": "...", "resume_offset": 65536 } ``` `resume_offset` is the number of bytes the receiver already has on disk. When non-zero, the sender seeks to that byte position before streaming. Peers that don't understand this field ignore it and send from the start — the receiver detects this by comparing incoming data to expected offset and will still verify the final SHA-256, but the partial bytes from the interrupted session will be overwritten (YAW/2-only interop degrades gracefully to a full re-download, not corruption). ### Receiver behaviour 1. On `file-offer`, the receiver scans its download directory for a `.tmp.meta` sidecar whose `sha256` matches the offer. 2. If found, the corresponding `.tmp` file's size is the resume offset. This is sent back in `file-accept`. 3. On DC open, the receiver opens the existing `.tmp` in append mode and re-hashes its existing bytes to restore the SHA-256 state. 4. On DC close with all bytes received, SHA-256 is verified. Success → sidecar removed, file renamed to final path. Hash mismatch → both files removed. 5. On DC close with fewer bytes than expected (interrupted again) → both files kept for the next resume attempt. ### Sidecar format Each in-progress `.tmp` file has a corresponding `.tmp.meta` JSON sidecar: ```json { "name": "archive.zip", "sha256": "abc...", "from": "", "size": 1048576 } ``` The sidecar is written when the transfer starts and removed on completion or corruption. Interrupted transfers keep the sidecar indefinitely. --- ## EXT-007 — P2P Message History Gossip **Status:** implemented (daemon mode) **Affects:** peer-to-peer wire (two new message types); IPC (new event) ### Motivation When a peer joins a network for the first time (or reconnects after an absence), they have no history. This extension lets them request recent messages from an existing peer over the already-established encrypted DataChannel, without involving the anchor. ### Wire messages #### `history_request` Sent by the newly-connected peer to the first peer whose hello is verified. One request per room. ```json { "type": "history_request", "room": "general", "since": 1700000000000, "limit": 200 } ``` | Field | Type | Description | |---------|---------------|-------------| | `room` | string | Room to request history for. | | `since` | int64 (ms) | Only return messages with `ts > since`. 0 = return up to `limit` most recent. | | `limit` | int (max 500) | Maximum messages to return. Responder may return fewer. | #### `history_chunk` ```json { "type": "history_chunk", "room": "general", "history": [ { "mid": "...", "from": "", "from_alias": "alice", "text": "hello", "ts": 1700000001000 } ], "history_done": true } ``` | Field | Type | Description | |----------------|--------|-------------| | `history` | array | Messages, oldest-first. | | `history_done` | bool | Always `true` (single-chunk response). | ### Deduplication `mid` is the deduplication key. The store uses `INSERT OR IGNORE` on `mid`, so receiving a message twice (live or via gossip) is a no-op. Messages without a `mid` are assigned one at receive time and are not gossipped. ### Behaviour - The **receiver** sends one `history_request` per known room immediately after hello verification with the **first** peer it connects to. Requesting only the first peer avoids fan-out amplification. - The **responder** queries its SQLite store and replies with a single `history_chunk`. `limit` is capped at 500 server-side. Rate-limited to one request per (peer, room) per 60 seconds. - Received history messages are saved to the local store (`INSERT OR IGNORE`) and emitted as `history_loaded` IPC events so the UI can display them. ### IPC event ```json { "type": "history_loaded", "room": "general", "messages": [...] } ``` Emitted once per room after a `history_chunk` is fully processed. The UI should render these messages with a visual separator from live messages. --- ## EXT-008 — Message Reactions ### Wire message (`PeerMessage`) ```json { "type": "reaction", "reaction_mid": "<32-hex mid of the target message>", "reaction_emoji": "👍" } ``` Sent on the normal mesh DataChannel (same as `chat`). No signing beyond the existing channel-level encryption. ### Semantics - A reaction is idempotent: the same `(mid, emoji, from_peer)` triple is stored with `INSERT OR IGNORE` — receiving a duplicate is a no-op. - There is no "un-react" wire message. Toggling off a reaction in the UI is a local-only operation in the current implementation. - `reaction_mid` must reference a message that exists in the local store; unknown mids are silently ignored. ### Storage SQLite table added as a migration: ```sql CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS reactions ( mid TEXT NOT NULL, emoji TEXT NOT NULL, from_peer TEXT NOT NULL, reacted_at DATETIME NOT NULL, PRIMARY KEY (mid, emoji, from_peer) ) ``` ### IPC **Command** — send a reaction (daemon and browser mode): ```json { "type": "send_reaction", "network_id": "...", "reaction_mid": "", "reaction_emoji": "👍" } ``` **Event** — reaction received or replayed from history: ```json { "type": "reaction", "network_id": "...", "peer_id": "<64-hex>", "reaction_mid": "", "reaction_emoji": "👍" } ``` Stored reactions are replayed as `reaction` IPC events when history is loaded (`sendStoredHistory`), so the UI always sees reactions alongside their messages. ### History replay When `sendStoredHistory` sends a `history_chunk`, it also queries `ReactionsForRoom` and emits one `reaction` event per stored reaction so clients receive the full reaction state on reconnect. ### Browser mode `browser.ts` mirrors the daemon behaviour independently: - `PeerConn.sendReaction(mid, emoji)` broadcasts `{ type: "reaction", reaction_mid, reaction_emoji }` over the DataChannel. - Incoming `reaction` wire frames are dispatched as `reaction` IPC events. - `BrowserAdapter.send()` handles `send_reaction` commands and both broadcasts to all peers and emits a local `reaction` event. - `sendChat` includes the `mid` in the wire frame so reactions can reference it correctly across peers. --- ## EXT-009 — Scoped Presence Query **Status:** proposed **Affects:** anchor WS protocol only (new request/response pair); no DataChannel or peer-to-peer wire changes ### Motivation YAW/2 §5.2 presence (`peer-join` / `peer-leave`) is push-only and scoped to peers who are simultaneously joined to the same network — you only learn someone is online by already being in the room with them. That's fine for chat, but it's the wrong shape for flit's "known devices" list: each paired device is its own isolated network (`net = NetHash(PairRoomName(idA, idB))`), and the app doesn't hold a persistent anchor connection per pairing while idle. Today the only way to find out if a known device is reachable is to attempt a full connect. This extension adds a lightweight, stateless query: "is peer X currently online in network Y?" — answerable from the anchor's existing in-memory `clients` registry with an O(1) lookup, no new server-side state. **Deliberately not** a global "is this pubkey online anywhere" query. The anchor's `clients` map is keyed globally by peer id, so an unscoped query would let anyone who knows a pubkey probe its online status across every network on the anchor, with no relationship required — a cross-identity presence oracle. Scoping the query to `(net, id)` keeps the access model identical to today's: knowing a network's hash is already the bar for joining it and observing presence the slow way (§5.1 `joined`, §5.2 `peer-join`); this extension only removes the need to actually join and wait. ### Wire messages Sent over the anchor WS connection. Does **not** require a prior `join` — the query is anchor-local and stateless, so a client may ask before joining, after leaving, or without ever joining any network on this connection. #### `presence_query` ```json { "type": "presence_query", "net": "<64-hex net hash>", "id": "<64-hex peer id>" } ``` | Field | Type | Description | |-------|--------|--------------| | `net` | string | Network hash, computed the same way as `join` (§5.1). | | `id` | string | Peer id being queried. | #### `presence` ```json { "type": "presence", "net": "<64-hex net hash>", "id": "<64-hex peer id>", "online": true } ``` `online` is `true` iff a client is currently registered with that exact `(net, id)` pair. Unknown `net`/`id` combinations return `online: false`, identical in shape to a peer who simply isn't connected — the anchor does not distinguish "never seen this net" from "peer not currently in it." ### Anchor implementation notes No new registry. `a.clients` is already keyed globally by peer id (`cmd/anchor/main.go`); the query handler does: ```go a.mu.RLock() c, ok := a.clients[id] online := ok && c.net == net a.mu.RUnlock() ``` Same lock, same map, no writes. YAW/2-only anchors that don't implement this extension simply never emit a `presence` reply — per §8, unknown request types are ignored by clients, so callers should treat "no reply within a short timeout" the same as `online: false` rather than blocking indefinitely. ### Security considerations - **No new information beyond what §5.2 already permits** — the requester must already know both `net` and `id` to ask, exactly the knowledge required to join that network and observe presence natively. This extension is a latency/statefulness shortcut, not a new capability. - **Does not enable identity-wide presence enumeration.** Because the query is scoped to a specific `net`, checking whether pubkey X is online requires already knowing at least one network X is a member of. An anchor operator or a client cannot use this to ask "where is X online" across all networks it serves. - **Rate limiting recommended** at the anchor (e.g. per-connection token bucket) to prevent a connection from being used to hammer many `(net, id)` guesses cheaply. This mirrors the existing `history_request` rate-limit precedent (EXT-007, one request per peer/room per 60s) even though the abuse shape here is different — presence queries are free of disk I/O but still worth bounding. - **No change to what the anchor can already infer.** An anchor could already tell that two ids are members of the same net by virtue of relaying between them; this extension doesn't let the anchor learn new relationships, only lets *clients* ask a question the anchor already had the answer to. ### Client usage (flit) Each known device already has a deterministic `net` (`PairRoomName(idA, idB)`, hashed). A "known devices" list can send one `presence_query` per entry — no persistent connection required per pairing — and render online/offline before the user taps Connect. A short client-side cache (a few seconds) is recommended to avoid re-querying on every render.