# waste-go Protocol Extensions These are additive extensions to [YAW/2](PROTOCOL.md) implemented by waste-go. They do **not** break compatibility — YAW/2-only peers silently ignore all new fields. Where a waste-go peer connects to a YAW/2-only peer, the extension simply has no effect on that peer. --- ## EXT-001 — Signed Invites **Status:** implemented **Affects:** `waste:` invite format, `hello` DataChannel message ### Motivation The base YAW/2 network model is open to anyone who knows the anchor URL and network name (or hash). This extension adds opt-in cryptographic membership gating: invites are signed by an existing peer, and peers that enforce `RequireInvite` reject hellos that carry no valid signed invite. ### Invite format changes The `waste:` invite payload (base64-encoded JSON) gains two optional fields: ```json { "anchor": "wss://...", "network": "friends", "net": "<64-hex SHA-256(yaw2-net:name)>", "inviter": "<64-hex Ed25519 pubkey of signing peer>", "sig": "" } ``` The signature covers the following bytes (null-separated): ``` anchor \x00 network \x00 net \x00 inviter ``` Unsigned invites (`inviter`/`sig` absent) remain valid for backward compat. ### Hello message extension The YAW/2 §6 hello message gains one optional field: ```json { "type": "hello", "id": "", "nick": "alice", "caps": ["chat", "file"], "sig": "", "invite": "waste:eyJ..." } ``` `invite` carries the full `waste:` string the connecting peer used to join. YAW/2-only peers ignore this field. ### Enforcement Per-network flag `RequireInvite` (set via `join_network` IPC command). When enabled: 1. A peer that presents no `invite` in hello is disconnected immediately. 2. A peer that presents an invite with no signature is disconnected. 3. A peer whose invite signature is invalid is disconnected. 4. A peer whose invite was signed by an unknown peer ID (not in the store or currently connected) is disconnected. The inviter's key must be a **known peer** — i.e. previously connected and stored in the per-network SQLite store, or currently connected. This forms a chain of trust: Alice (founder) invites Bob; Bob's key is now known; Bob can invite Carol, whose invite Alice will also accept. **Default:** off. Networks opt in. Existing networks with no RequireInvite behave exactly as before. --- ## EXT-002 — Hash-based Hang Link **Status:** implemented **Affects:** web UI URL handling only, no wire changes ### Motivation A shareable URL that pre-fills the join form without conveying cryptographic membership. Suitable for public announcements ("come hang out here"). The fragment is never sent to the server, keeping the network name opaque to server logs and HTTP intermediaries. ### Format ``` https://host/#waste:eyJ... ``` The fragment payload is the standard `waste:` base64 JSON with only `network` and `anchor` fields — no `inviter`, no `sig`. This does **not** grant membership on networks with `RequireInvite` enabled; it only pre-fills the join form. The web UI generates hang links via the 🔗 button in the Networks sidebar section. Arriving users see the join form pre-populated and still need a proper signed invite (if the network enforces it) to be accepted by peers. --- ## EXT-003 — Multi-Share Configuration **Status:** implemented **Affects:** IPC protocol only, no peer-to-peer wire changes ### New IPC commands ```jsonc {"type":"add_share","path":"/home/alice/Music"} // global {"type":"add_share","path":"/home/alice/Docs","network_ids":["abc123"]} // scoped {"type":"remove_share","path":"/home/alice/Music"} {"type":"list_shares"} ``` ### New IPC event ```jsonc {"type":"shares_list","shares":[{"path":"...","networks":["*"]}]} ``` ### Persistence `shares.json` in the data directory (next to `identity.json`). Each entry: ```json { "path": "/absolute/path", "networks": ["*"] } ``` `networks: ["*"]` = global (all networks). Specific network IDs = scoped. Coexists with the legacy `set_share_dir` single-dir mechanism. File listings returned by `get_file_list` and `MsgFileListReq` include entries from all applicable share roots, with relative `path` fields (e.g. `"path": "docs/report.pdf"`). --- ## EXT-004 — TURN Relay (browser mode) **Status:** implemented (browser mode + daemon mode) **Affects:** ICE server configuration only, no wire changes The browser adapter reads `WASTE_CONFIG.turnURL` and fetches short-lived credentials from the anchor's `GET /turn-credentials` endpoint (derived from `WASTE_CONFIG.signalURL`, or overridden via `WASTE_CONFIG.turnCredentialsURL`). The anchor computes the credential using HMAC-SHA1 of the username (coturn `use-auth-secret` scheme) — the shared secret itself is never sent to the browser. Daemon mode does the equivalent computation locally, since the daemon already holds `-turn-secret` server-side. YAW/2 §0 explicitly declines TURN ("No relay (TURN)"). This extension is opt-in via server configuration and does not affect peers that omit it. --- ## EXT-005 — Per-Network Path in FileEntry **Status:** implemented **Affects:** `MsgFileListResp` wire message (additive field) `FileEntry` gains an optional `path` field carrying the file's relative path within its share root (e.g. `"docs/report.pdf"`). Peers that don't understand this field continue to use `name` for display and download requests. `MsgFileListReq` / `get` requests use `path` as the lookup key when present, falling back to `name` for backward compat with peers that don't send `path`. --- ## EXT-006 — File Transfer Resume **Status:** implemented (daemon mode) **Affects:** `file-accept` wire message (additive field) ### Motivation A transfer interrupted mid-stream (peer disconnect, network drop) can be continued from where it left off on the next offer of the same file, avoiding a full re-download. ### Protocol change `file-accept` gains one optional field: ```json { "type": "file-accept", "xid": "...", "resume_offset": 65536 } ``` `resume_offset` is the number of bytes the receiver already has on disk. When non-zero, the sender seeks to that byte position before streaming. Peers that don't understand this field ignore it and send from the start — the receiver detects this by comparing incoming data to expected offset and will still verify the final SHA-256, but the partial bytes from the interrupted session will be overwritten (YAW/2-only interop degrades gracefully to a full re-download, not corruption). ### Receiver behaviour 1. On `file-offer`, the receiver scans its download directory for a `.tmp.meta` sidecar whose `sha256` matches the offer. 2. If found, the corresponding `.tmp` file's size is the resume offset. This is sent back in `file-accept`. 3. On DC open, the receiver opens the existing `.tmp` in append mode and re-hashes its existing bytes to restore the SHA-256 state. 4. On DC close with all bytes received, SHA-256 is verified. Success → sidecar removed, file renamed to final path. Hash mismatch → both files removed. 5. On DC close with fewer bytes than expected (interrupted again) → both files kept for the next resume attempt. ### Sidecar format Each in-progress `.tmp` file has a corresponding `.tmp.meta` JSON sidecar: ```json { "name": "archive.zip", "sha256": "abc...", "from": "", "size": 1048576 } ``` The sidecar is written when the transfer starts and removed on completion or corruption. Interrupted transfers keep the sidecar indefinitely. --- ## EXT-007 — P2P Message History Gossip **Status:** implemented (daemon mode) **Affects:** peer-to-peer wire (two new message types); IPC (new event) ### Motivation When a peer joins a network for the first time (or reconnects after an absence), they have no history. This extension lets them request recent messages from an existing peer over the already-established encrypted DataChannel, without involving the anchor. ### Wire messages #### `history_request` Sent by the newly-connected peer to the first peer whose hello is verified. One request per room. ```json { "type": "history_request", "room": "general", "since": 1700000000000, "limit": 200 } ``` | Field | Type | Description | |---------|---------------|-------------| | `room` | string | Room to request history for. | | `since` | int64 (ms) | Only return messages with `ts > since`. 0 = return up to `limit` most recent. | | `limit` | int (max 500) | Maximum messages to return. Responder may return fewer. | #### `history_chunk` ```json { "type": "history_chunk", "room": "general", "history": [ { "mid": "...", "from": "", "from_alias": "alice", "text": "hello", "ts": 1700000001000 } ], "history_done": true } ``` | Field | Type | Description | |----------------|--------|-------------| | `history` | array | Messages, oldest-first. | | `history_done` | bool | Always `true` (single-chunk response). | ### Deduplication `mid` is the deduplication key. The store uses `INSERT OR IGNORE` on `mid`, so receiving a message twice (live or via gossip) is a no-op. Messages without a `mid` are assigned one at receive time and are not gossipped. ### Behaviour - The **receiver** sends one `history_request` per known room immediately after hello verification with the **first** peer it connects to. Requesting only the first peer avoids fan-out amplification. - The **responder** queries its SQLite store and replies with a single `history_chunk`. `limit` is capped at 500 server-side. Rate-limited to one request per (peer, room) per 60 seconds. - Received history messages are saved to the local store (`INSERT OR IGNORE`) and emitted as `history_loaded` IPC events so the UI can display them. ### IPC event ```json { "type": "history_loaded", "room": "general", "messages": [...] } ``` Emitted once per room after a `history_chunk` is fully processed. The UI should render these messages with a visual separator from live messages. --- ## EXT-008 — Message Reactions ### Wire message (`PeerMessage`) ```json { "type": "reaction", "reaction_mid": "<32-hex mid of the target message>", "reaction_emoji": "👍" } ``` Sent on the normal mesh DataChannel (same as `chat`). No signing beyond the existing channel-level encryption. ### Semantics - A reaction is idempotent: the same `(mid, emoji, from_peer)` triple is stored with `INSERT OR IGNORE` — receiving a duplicate is a no-op. - There is no "un-react" wire message. Toggling off a reaction in the UI is a local-only operation in the current implementation. - `reaction_mid` must reference a message that exists in the local store; unknown mids are silently ignored. ### Storage SQLite table added as a migration: ```sql CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS reactions ( mid TEXT NOT NULL, emoji TEXT NOT NULL, from_peer TEXT NOT NULL, reacted_at DATETIME NOT NULL, PRIMARY KEY (mid, emoji, from_peer) ) ``` ### IPC **Command** — send a reaction (daemon and browser mode): ```json { "type": "send_reaction", "network_id": "...", "reaction_mid": "", "reaction_emoji": "👍" } ``` **Event** — reaction received or replayed from history: ```json { "type": "reaction", "network_id": "...", "peer_id": "<64-hex>", "reaction_mid": "", "reaction_emoji": "👍" } ``` Stored reactions are replayed as `reaction` IPC events when history is loaded (`sendStoredHistory`), so the UI always sees reactions alongside their messages. ### History replay When `sendStoredHistory` sends a `history_chunk`, it also queries `ReactionsForRoom` and emits one `reaction` event per stored reaction so clients receive the full reaction state on reconnect. ### Browser mode `browser.ts` mirrors the daemon behaviour independently: - `PeerConn.sendReaction(mid, emoji)` broadcasts `{ type: "reaction", reaction_mid, reaction_emoji }` over the DataChannel. - Incoming `reaction` wire frames are dispatched as `reaction` IPC events. - `BrowserAdapter.send()` handles `send_reaction` commands and both broadcasts to all peers and emits a local `reaction` event. - `sendChat` includes the `mid` in the wire frame so reactions can reference it correctly across peers.