Server: Express + better-sqlite3 (WAL), multi-recipient key-wrapping
per IMPLEMENTATION.md's design — vaults/recipients/vault_grants/
access_log. Two auth paths: ADMIN_PASSWORD header for recipient
management and revoke (pure metadata operations), signed-request
auth (Ed25519 signature over method+path+timestamp+body-hash) for
push/pull/grant, mirroring the spirit of this project family's other
signed-handshake patterns without naming them.
CLI: identity init/show/set-id, push/pull/grant/log, admin recipient
add/list/remove and revoke. Grant is a client-side crypto operation
(the granter unwraps the vault's current key locally and reseals it
for the new recipient) rather than a server-side operation, since the
server never holds an unwrapped key to grant with.
Verified end-to-end with two independent local identities against a
live server and separately against the built Docker image: register,
push, pull (granted and ungranted), grant without re-pushing, admin
revoke, a subsequent rotation confirming the revoked recipient stays
excluded, and rejection of missing/malformed signed-request auth.
Two real bugs caught during verification, not just written up:
- libsodium-wrappers' published ESM build does a relative import only
resolvable under bundler-style resolution — broken under plain Node
ESM. Fixed via createRequire to force the CJS build.
- Express's req.path inside a sub-router is relative to the mount
point, which would have silently mismatched a client signing the
full request path. Fixed by verifying against req.originalUrl.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
README covers the pitch and how this differs from Vault/Doppler (too
heavy) and a static age/sops-encrypted file in git (no live rotation,
no access log). IMPLEMENTATION covers the multi-recipient key-wrapping
scheme (age/sops-style, adapted to libsodium primitives already used
in flit/waste-go), the flat vault/recipient/grant/access-log schema,
rotation and revocation semantics (including the standard "revoke
doesn't retroactively unread already-decrypted secrets" caveat), CLI
surface, and deploy-script integration.
Motivated by a real, already-felt annoyance: every repo in this
project family (goonk, wisp, npm-statuspage, flit, waste-go) has its
own hand-copied .env today, with no rotation story and no record of
which machine has which secret.
No code yet — design stage. Admin auth mechanism flagged as needing a
decision before implementation starts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
