Per-question resolution, per best practice rather than deferral: - Push authorization: closed the least-privilege gap where read implied write. vault_grants gained can_write (default true, so nothing existing changes); enforced on push and grant (granting others is itself a mutation of vault membership, so it needs write too, not just read). 'keep grant --read-only' creates a read-only grant. - Version history: not full history (conflates "undo a typo'd push" with "this leaked, stop retaining it" into one mechanism). Retains exactly one previous version as a rollback safety net (vaults.prev_ciphertext/prev_nonce + a vault_grants_previous mirror table so recipients can unwrap it), plus 'keep push --purge' for compromise-driven rotations that explicitly skips retention and wipes any existing previous version too. - Per-secret-key granularity: resolved by NOT building it — documented the escape hatch (split into more vaults) instead of adding partial- decrypt complexity for a problem the existing primitive solves. One more real bug caught during verification: the CLI's --previous flag initially signed a path including its query string, but the server verifies against req.originalUrl with the query stripped — a mismatch that would have made every --previous request fail signature verification. Fixed by splitting the signed path from the request URL in signedFetch, signing only the former. Verified end-to-end with three independent identities: read-only grant correctly blocked from push and from granting others, write access and read-only status both preserved correctly across a rotation, previous- version pull working for a routine push and correctly unavailable to every recipient after a purge push. Also re-verified against a fresh Docker build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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