Two changes based on further review: - Explicitly considers and rejects letting keep's server execute the redeploy directly on announce, even though co-location removes the credential/network objection that sank the CI-SSHes-in alternative. The reason it's still wrong: a fully compromised keep server today can't do anything worse than leak ciphertext, since it never holds a decryption key. Giving it exec capability breaks that property — a routine web app bug becomes "triggers arbitrary redeploys," not "leaks encrypted blobs." Also notes the concrete cost: doing this from inside a container needs the Docker socket mounted in, which is broadly equivalent to root on the host. - Replaces the "vault key = deploy directory name" assumption with an explicit .keep-vault marker file per project directory. Repo name, deploy directory name, and vault key are three independent strings in practice (confirmed by a real example already in this fleet) — no naming convention should assume any two of them match. Bootstrap is now: choose a vault key, keep push it, drop a one-line .keep-vault file. CI's announce step uses the same deliberately hardcoded key, never derived from the repo name automatically. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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363 lines
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Markdown
# Proposal: announce + a self-deploying agent, with a no-`keep` fallback
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**Status:** proposed, not built. Self-contained — written so a fresh agent
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with no prior conversation context can pick this up and implement it
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without anything explained first.
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## Context (read this first)
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Full background on `keep` is in [README.md](./README.md) and
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[IMPLEMENTATION.md](./IMPLEMENTATION.md) — read both before touching
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code. The relevant existing pieces for this proposal:
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- `src/server/db.ts` — SQLite (better-sqlite3, WAL mode). `vaults`,
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`recipients`, `vault_grants`, `vault_grants_previous`, `access_log`.
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- `src/server/routes.ts` — recipient-authenticated (signed-request)
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routes: `push`, `pull`, `grant`, `log`, plus `exists` and
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`recipients` (both used by the CLI to compute who to re-wrap for).
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- `src/server/auth.ts` — `requireRecipientAuth` (Ed25519 signature over
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method+path+timestamp+body-hash, verified against `req.originalUrl`
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with the query string stripped — see IMPLEMENTATION.md's "What was
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verified end-to-end" for a bug that already bit this exact mechanism
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once) and `requireAdminAuth` (`X-Admin-Password` header).
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- `src/cli/` — `identity.ts`, `recipient.ts`, `vault.ts`,
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`signedFetch.ts` (note: `signedFetch`'s `path` param must never
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include a query string — see the comment there for why).
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- `scripts/deploy.sh` (this repo) — pulls `<project>/<env>` from `keep`
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into `$DEPLOY_ROOT/<project>/.env`, then `docker compose up -d` for
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one project. Assumes the vault already exists and this machine
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already has a grant on it. **Superseded by the real deploy script
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below as the thing this proposal actually patches** — kept in this
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repo as a single-project example/fallback, not the production path.
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- **The real, already-running deploy script — on the host, not in any
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repo.** A fixed-array bulk script, already in production use, looping
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over roughly a dozen project directories:
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```bash
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ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
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PROJECTS=(proj1 proj2 proj3 proj4 proj5 proj6 proj7 proj8 proj9 proj10 proj11 proj12)
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for project in "${PROJECTS[@]}"; do
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dir="$ROOT/$project"
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[ -f "$dir/docker-compose.yml" ] || { echo "skip: $project"; continue; }
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(cd "$dir" && docker compose up -d) || FAILED+=("$project")
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done
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docker image prune -f
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```
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Two things about it that matter for this proposal: **it never runs
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`docker compose pull`** — freshness comes entirely from each
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project's own `pull_policy: always` in its `docker-compose.yml`
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(`up -d` re-pulls implicitly). And **it loops over a fixed, explicit
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array**, not directory auto-discovery — adding a project means
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editing this array by hand. This is the actual thing to patch, not a
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new per-project script; see Design §4.
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- **Prerequisite gap, found while writing this proposal, not yet fixed
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everywhere**: `pull_policy: always` isn't universal across the
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fleet — confirmed present in roughly half the projects checked,
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confirmed missing in several others (one of which was fixed in this
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session — a sibling project's `docker-compose.yml` didn't have it, a
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regression from copying another project's compose file without
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carrying this line over), and unchecked for the rest (no local
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checkout available at proposal time). **This is independent of
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`keep` entirely** — the bulk script can't redeploy any project
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missing this line regardless of whether that project ever adopts
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`keep`, and it should be swept fleet-wide before or alongside this
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work, not as part of it.
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- `.gitea/workflows/docker.yml` (present in `keep` and other sibling
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projects) — builds and pushes an image to the Gitea container
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registry on every push to `main`. Does **not** currently deploy
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anything — that's the manual/scheduled bulk script above today.
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## Motivation
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The CI workflow already produces a fresh image on every push. Deployment
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is still a manual "SSH in and run the deploy script" step. The obvious
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fix — CI SSHes into the VPS and runs the deploy — was considered and
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rejected: it means a standing SSH credential with production-deploy
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rights sits in Gitea's CI secrets, reachable by whatever's executing on
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the shared runner across every project it builds. A compromised build
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step in any one project could then reach every other project's deploy
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target. That's a real regression from where `keep` already left things
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(see IMPLEMENTATION.md's resolved "read no longer implies write" — the
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whole point was *not* concentrating reach into one identity).
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The fix that doesn't reintroduce that problem: **reverse the direction.**
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CI never reaches into a VPS. Instead, CI tells `keep` "there's a new
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image for this project," and each VPS — which already has to run
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*something* locally to redeploy itself — polls `keep` for that signal
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and acts on it locally, using an identity and grant it already legitimately
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holds. `keep`'s server never executes anything remotely; it stays a pure
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relay, same posture as everything else it does.
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**Not every project will have been migrated to `keep` yet.** Bootstrapping
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a project (register a recipient, grant it, push the first vault) is a
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real, deliberate step per project, and there'll be a period — maybe a
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long one — where some projects have it and some don't. The redeploy path
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has to work identically well for both, defaulting to exactly what
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happens today (a plain `docker compose up -d`, relying on that project's
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own `pull_policy: always`) for anything not yet bootstrapped, rather than
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either blocking deploys entirely or hard-failing on missing vaults.
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### Considered and rejected: `keep` executes the redeploy itself
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Since `keep`'s own server will run on the same VPS as the deploy targets,
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it's tempting to skip the polling indirection entirely and have `keep`
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shell out to the deploy script directly when it receives an `announce` —
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no new SSH credential, no new network-reachable pathway, since nothing
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is reaching *into* the box that wasn't already running on it.
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Rejected anyway, because it trades away a property that's been the
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throughline of `keep`'s whole design: **today, a fully compromised
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`keep` server — not just a compromised client identity — can't do
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anything worse than leak ciphertext and metadata**, because the server
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never holds a decryption key. The moment `keep` can also execute a
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command on `announce`, that stops being true — a bug in the HTTP layer
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(not even a cryptographic break; an ordinary web app bug, an auth check
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wrong on some edge case) becomes "attacker triggers arbitrary
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redeploys," not "attacker sees encrypted blobs they can't read." That's
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a new class of bad outcome, not a bigger version of an existing one, and
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it's not worth trading for skipping a polling loop.
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There's also a concrete operational cost, not just a principle: actually
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running `docker compose up -d` from inside `keep`'s own process would
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need either the Docker socket mounted into `keep`'s container
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(`/var/run/docker.sock` — widely treated as equivalent to handing that
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container root on the host) or running `keep` outside a container
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entirely, throwing away the isolation its own `Dockerfile` already
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provides today.
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`keep` stays a pure relay regardless of where it's deployed. Something
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*outside* `keep`'s own process boundary does the polling and the
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executing — see §4.
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## Design
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### 1. `announce` — a distinct verb from `push`/`pull`
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An image tag isn't a secret. It doesn't belong inside the encrypted vault
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payload alongside real credentials — that's a category mismatch (deploy
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metadata living inside a secrets blob), not just an implementation
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convenience either way. `announce` is its own small mechanism:
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```sql
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS vault_announcements (
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vault_key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
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tag TEXT NOT NULL,
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announced_at INTEGER NOT NULL,
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announced_by TEXT NOT NULL -- recipient_id
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);
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```
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One row per vault — like the vault's own one-previous-version retention,
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this is "latest known state," not a history. If a real audit trail of
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every announce is wanted later, `access_log` already records the action;
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this table is just the fast-path "what's the current tag" read, kept
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separate from the log on purpose (reading current state back out of an
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append-only log is the wrong tool for that job — same reasoning
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`IMPLEMENTATION.md` already gives for why `vault_grants_previous` is a
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real table and not a log replay).
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### 2. API
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```
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POST /api/vaults/:key/announce -- { tag: string } — requires ANY grant on the vault (read-only is enough; announcing isn't a secrets mutation)
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GET /api/vaults/:key/announce -- { tag, announcedAt, announcedBy } | 404 if nothing announced yet — requires a grant, same as pull
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```
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Both go through `requireRecipientAuth`, identical shape to the existing
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routes. `POST` only requires *a* grant (not write) — reuse `hasGrant`,
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not `hasWriteGrant` — since this isn't a mutation of the vault's secret
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content, just a signal, and CI's identity for a project should be able to
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stay read-only even after this feature exists. (This is worth stating
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explicitly since a naive implementation might reach for `hasWriteGrant`
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by analogy with `push` — resist that; it would silently widen CI's
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required permissions for no real reason.)
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### 3. CLI
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```
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keep announce <vault> --tag <tag> -- POST, requires a grant on <vault>
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keep watch <vault> [--interval 60] -- polls GET .../announce every N seconds, prints the tag on change, exits nonzero if the vault doesn't exist / no grant (see fallback below)
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```
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`keep watch` is deliberately dumb — plain polling, not a websocket or
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long-poll. Matches the polling pattern already used elsewhere in this
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project family, and a 60-second detection lag for a deploy is fine.
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Don't build push-based notification for this; it's more machinery for a
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problem polling already solves adequately.
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### 4. Patch the existing loop — don't build a parallel script
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This is the part the fallback requirement is actually about. The real
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deploy script already does the one thing that matters (a loop over a
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fixed project list, `docker compose up -d` per project, relying on
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`pull_policy: always` for freshness) — the change is inserting one
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`keep`-with-fallback step per iteration, in place, not writing a new
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per-project `agent.sh` that duplicates the loop/array/failure-tracking
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logic the real script already has:
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```bash
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for project in "${PROJECTS[@]}"; do
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dir="$ROOT/$project"
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[ -f "$dir/docker-compose.yml" ] || { echo "skip: $project"; continue; }
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echo ""
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echo "▶ $project"
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# A vault key is NOT assumed to match the deploy-directory name — repo
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# names, deploy directory names, and vault keys are three independent
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# strings in practice (a repo can be named one thing, its deploy
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# directory another, entirely by history/accident). .keep-vault is an
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# explicit, one-time-per-project marker: if it's missing, this project
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# was never bootstrapped onto keep (or never will be — a static site
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# with no secrets), and the loop falls through to exactly what it did
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# before keep existed. Every keep call here is allowed to fail;
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# failure means "keep doesn't apply to this project," never "stop the
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# deploy."
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if [ -f "$dir/.keep-vault" ]; then
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vault="$(cat "$dir/.keep-vault")"
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if keep pull "$vault" --out "$dir/.env.new" 2>/dev/null; then
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mv "$dir/.env.new" "$dir/.env"
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else
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rm -f "$dir/.env.new"
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fi
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fi
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if (cd "$dir" && docker compose up -d 2>&1); then
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echo " ✓ $project up"
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else
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echo " ✗ $project failed"
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FAILED+=("$project")
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fi
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done
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```
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Bootstrapping a project onto `keep` becomes: choose a vault key (no
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naming constraint — doesn't need to match the repo or the directory),
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`keep push` it, grant whichever recipients need it, and
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`echo "<the vault key>" > "$dir/.keep-vault"`. One file, human-readable,
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`cat`-able to check what's configured, no second array in this script to
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keep in sync by hand as directories get renamed or reorganized.
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Notice `announce`/`watch` aren't actually load-bearing in this version —
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whatever already triggers this script (cron, systemd timer, or still
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run by hand) keeps triggering it exactly as before, and `keep pull`
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either updates `.env` or silently doesn't. That's deliberate: **the
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existing script, patched this way, is already a complete, correct
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baseline** — keep-bootstrapped projects get fresh secrets on every run,
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everything else behaves identically to today. `announce` sits on top as
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a latency optimization *for however this script gets triggered*, not a
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requirement for this patch to be complete — see the next section.
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### 5. Where `announce`/`watch` actually earn their keep
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Two independent benefits, worth keeping conceptually separate — and the
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second one looks different than it would for a one-agent-per-project
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design, because the real script is one bulk all-or-nothing sweep, not N
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independent watchers:
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- **Secrets sourcing** — `keep pull` instead of a hand-placed `.env`.
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Available per-project the moment its vault exists and this machine
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has a grant on it. This is what §4's patch already delivers, on its
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own, with zero dependency on `announce`.
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- **Waking the sweep early** — however the bulk script currently gets
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triggered (cron, systemd timer, or still by hand), `announce` could
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let it wake immediately on a push instead of waiting for the next
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scheduled run. The natural fit given the script's actual shape: `keep
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watch-any <vault1> <vault2> ...` blocking until *any* watched vault's
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tag changes, used as the trigger for a full sweep — not a per-project
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selective redeploy. Selective ("only redeploy the one project that
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actually changed") would require reshaping the script away from its
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current fixed-array-sweep model into something that takes a target
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project as an argument, which is a real behavior change to something
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already in production use, not a small addition — out of scope here.
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Deliberately **not** building the wake-the-sweep-early mechanism in this
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pass. Ship §4's patch first — it already satisfies the fallback
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requirement completely and delivers the secrets-sourcing benefit on its
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own. Whether waiting up to one scheduled interval for a redeploy is
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actually a problem worth solving with `announce`/`watch-any` should be
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judged after living with the patched bulk script for a while, not
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designed in advance of any real signal that the wait matters.
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### 6. CI workflow addition
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One step appended to the existing `docker.yml`, after the existing
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build-and-push step, best-effort (must not fail the build if this
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project hasn't been bootstrapped onto `keep` yet):
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```yaml
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- name: announce to keep
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continue-on-error: true
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run: keep announce myapp/production --tag ${{ steps.meta.outputs.short_sha }}
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```
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The vault key here (`myapp/production`) is a **literal, hardcoded string
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in this specific repo's own workflow file** — never derived from
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`${{ github.repository }}` or any other automatic source. Same reasoning
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as §4's `.keep-vault` file: the repo's own name, its deploy directory's
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name, and its vault key are three independent strings that happen to
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often look similar and are not guaranteed to match (see Context — a real
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example already exists in this fleet). Whoever bootstraps a project onto
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`keep` should paste the same deliberately-chosen vault key into both this
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workflow step and that project's `.keep-vault` file, not rely on either
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side inferring it from something else.
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`continue-on-error: true` is load-bearing, not incidental — a project
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without a `keep` identity registered yet must still build and push its
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image successfully. This step failing should be silent/expected for any
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not-yet-bootstrapped project, not a red X on the workflow.
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## Security considerations
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- `announce` leaks a little more than `push`/`pull` did: the *tag*
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itself is now server-visible (previously, if you were being strict,
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even the fact that a new image existed wasn't something `keep` needed
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to know). This is an intentional, accepted tradeoff — a git short-SHA
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or version tag isn't sensitive, and the whole feature only works if
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`keep` can see it.
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- Requiring only a read grant (not write) to `announce` means a
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compromised read-only CI identity could announce a *false* tag,
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pointing the fleet at an attacker-chosen image — worth flagging even
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though `keep` never pulls or runs that image itself, only relays the
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string. The actual `docker compose pull` on each VPS still pulls from
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the configured registry using the tag it was told, so this is
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equivalent in severity to that CI identity's build step being
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compromised in the first place (it could already push a bad image
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under a legitimate tag) — not a new capability, just worth stating
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plainly rather than leaving implicit.
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- The fallback path must never silently downgrade a *bootstrapped*
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project to running with a stale `.env` because of a transient `keep`
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outage. As written, `keep pull` failing for any reason (network
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blip, `keep` server down, not just "not bootstrapped") falls through
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to "deploy with whatever `.env` is already on disk" — for an
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already-bootstrapped project, that's the *previous* `keep pull`'s
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output, still valid, not a downgrade. This only becomes a real problem
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if a bootstrapped project's very first deploy attempt coincides with
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`keep` being unreachable, in which case there's no `.env` on disk yet
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at all and `docker compose up` will fail for the mundane reason that
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required env vars are missing — a loud, obvious failure, not a silent
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wrong-secrets one.
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## Open questions
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- **`.keep-vault` format** — a bare vault-key string is enough for
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today's one-environment-per-directory reality. If a directory ever
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needs to deploy more than one environment from the same
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`docker-compose.yml` (unlikely given the current fleet shape, but not
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impossible), a bare string stops being enough and it'd need to become
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a small key=value file or similar. Not designing that ahead of an
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actual need — ship the bare-string version.
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- **Fleet-wide `pull_policy: always` sweep** — a prerequisite this
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proposal depends on but doesn't itself fix (see Context). Should
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happen before or alongside this work, as its own small pass, not
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bundled into this one.
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- **Does `watch`/`watch-any` ever get used**, or does the
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already-scheduled bulk sweep turn out to be good enough forever?
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Deliberately left unbuilt (see §5) until there's a real signal the
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wait between scheduled runs is worth solving.
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- **Multi-VPS fan-out for one project** — if a project ever runs on more
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than one box, `announce` already supports that for free (any number of
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watchers can poll the same vault's announce endpoint), but this hasn't
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been exercised and might reveal something not accounted for here.
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