keep/README.md

# keep

A self-hosted, end-to-end encrypted secrets store for deploy scripts.
`keep pull myapp/production` gets you a `.env`-shaped bundle of secrets,
decrypted locally — the server never sees plaintext values, and never
sees the key that would let it.

## Why

Across a small family of self-hosted projects, every repo tends to have
its own `.env`/`.env.example` pair, and every one of those `.env` files
exists today by being hand-copied onto whatever machine needs it. That's
a real, already-felt annoyance, not a hypothetical one:

- Rotating a credential means finding and updating every machine that has
  a copy, by hand.
- There's no record of which machine has which secret, or when it was
  last updated.
- Onboarding a new deploy target means manually reconstructing a `.env`
  from memory, a password manager note, or asking "hey, what's the value
  for X."

`keep` is a small always-on service that holds encrypted secret bundles
and lets authorized machines/people pull them, decrypted locally, without
ever exposing plaintext to the server in between.

## What it isn't

- **Not Vault or Doppler.** Those are the established, heavier answers —
  full policy engines, dynamic secrets, enterprise everything. `keep` is
  the "already-solved problem, but self-hosted and scoped to what this
  actually needs" answer, closer in spirit to `age`/`sops` (multi-recipient
  encrypted files) than to a full secrets-management platform.
- **Not a static encrypted file committed to git**, which is what
  `age`/`sops` typically produce. `keep` exists specifically for the two
  things a committed encrypted file can't give you without re-running a
  tool and re-committing: **live rotation** (push once, everyone with
  access can pull the update) and **an access log** (who/what actually
  fetched a secret bundle, and when — a git history shows content
  changes, not access).
- **Not an ephemeral file-drop tool.** Something built for single-retrieval,
  self-destructing file sharing is the opposite of what a secret needs to
  be — a deploy script needs to fetch the same bundle on every deploy, not
  once and then have it vanish.

## Core model

Adapts the pattern `age`/`sops`/PGP already use for multi-recipient
encrypted files — a symmetric key encrypts the actual payload, and that
symmetric key is separately "wrapped" (encrypted) once per authorized
recipient's public key — into a live service instead of a static file:

1. Each client (a developer's machine, a deploy script running on a VPS)
   has its own Ed25519/X25519 keypair.
2. A vault (`myapp/production`, `myapp/staging`, whatever key) holds one
   encrypted blob — the actual secret bundle, encrypted under a random
   symmetric key.
3. That symmetric key is wrapped separately for every recipient granted
   access to that vault. The server stores N small wrapped-key blobs, one
   per recipient, alongside the one encrypted payload.
4. `keep pull <vault>` fetches the payload plus this identity's wrapped
   key, unwraps locally with the private key, decrypts, and prints (or
   writes) the `.env`-shaped result.
5. Revoking a recipient's access is deleting their one wrapped-key row —
   the payload and every other recipient's access are untouched.
6. Rotating a secret is `keep push <vault>` again — a new random
   symmetric key, re-wrapped for every currently-granted recipient. Cheap,
   since the recipient list rarely changes. By default the outgoing
   version is kept as a one-step rollback safety net (`keep pull
   --previous`); `keep push --purge` skips that for compromise-driven
   rotations where the old value should stop being retrievable, full stop.
7. Grants distinguish read from write — a recipient can be given
   read-only access (`keep grant --read-only`), which can pull a vault
   but can't push to it or grant others access.

Full design — data model, the atomic-grant/revoke details, and what this
explicitly does and doesn't protect against — is in
[IMPLEMENTATION.md](./IMPLEMENTATION.md). Ideas for wiring this into
existing deploy scripts are in [INTEGRATION.md](./INTEGRATION.md).

## Quickstart

```bash
# 1. Run the server (see "Docker" below for a real deploy)
cp .env.example .env
npm install
npm run dev:server

# 2. Each machine/person that needs access generates its own identity
npm run cli -- identity init
#   → prints a public key

# 3. An admin registers that public key as a recipient
KEEP_ADMIN_PASSWORD=... npm run cli -- recipient add --label "my-laptop" --pubkey <hex>
#   → prints a recipient id

# 4. The machine that generated the identity records its assigned id
npm run cli -- identity set-id <recipient-id>

# 5. Push a vault — the pusher is automatically its first recipient
npm run cli -- push myapp/production --file .env.production

# 6. Anyone else with a grant can pull it, decrypted, ready to use
npm run cli -- pull myapp/production > .env
```

## Granting, revoking, rotating

```bash
# An existing recipient of a vault can grant a NEW recipient access,
# without needing admin rights or re-encrypting the payload. Read access
# by default — add --read-only for a recipient that should only ever
# pull, never push (e.g. an automated deploy identity):
keep grant myapp/production <new-recipient-id>
keep grant myapp/production <deploy-recipient-id> --read-only

# Revoking is an admin operation — pure metadata deletion, immediate:
KEEP_ADMIN_PASSWORD=... keep revoke myapp/production <recipient-id>

# Revoke only stops FUTURE pulls. If this was a compromise response,
# rotate AND purge — --purge skips retaining the outgoing version as a
# rollback, since the whole point of rotating for a leak is that the old
# value stops being retrievable by anyone:
keep push myapp/production --file .env.production --purge

# A routine push (no compromise involved) keeps the outgoing version as
# a one-step rollback safety net:
keep push myapp/production --file .env.production
keep pull myapp/production --previous   # "oops, undo that last push"

# See who's touched a vault and when:
keep log myapp/production
```

Pushing to an existing vault requires a *write* grant — a read-only
recipient can pull but can't push or grant others access. A brand-new
vault's first push is always read-write for the pusher.

## Docker

```bash
docker compose up -d
```

Uses the image from `IMAGE` in `.env`. For a local build:

```bash
docker build -t keep:local .
IMAGE=keep:local docker compose up -d
```

## CI/CD

Gitea Actions workflow at `.gitea/workflows/docker.yml`. Builds and
pushes to the Gitea container registry on every push to `main`. Requires
a `TKNTKN` secret (PAT with `packages:write`) in the repo settings.

## Environment variables

| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `PORT` | `3050` | Port to listen on |
| `DATA_DIR` | `./data` | Where the SQLite DB (vaults, recipients, grants) lives |
| `ADMIN_PASSWORD` | — | Gates recipient add/remove and revoke. Unset disables `/api/admin/*` (503) — push/pull/grant for already-registered recipients keep working |
| `REQUEST_MAX_SKEW_SECONDS` | `300` | Replay-protection window for signed CLI requests |

CLI-side: `KEEP_SERVER_URL` (default `http://localhost:3050`),
`KEEP_ADMIN_PASSWORD` (for admin commands: `recipient add/list/remove`,
`revoke`).

## Status

Implemented: identity, push/pull/grant/revoke/log, read/write grant
scoping, one-step rollback with an explicit purge mode for
compromise-driven rotations, admin recipient management, Docker deploy.
Verified end-to-end — two and three independent identities, read-only
grants correctly blocked from push/grant, grants preserved across
rotation, previous-version pull working and correctly wiped by
`--purge` for every recipient, malformed-auth rejection — against both
a local server and the built Docker image. See
[IMPLEMENTATION.md](./IMPLEMENTATION.md) for the full design and its
resolved decisions (per-secret-key granularity deliberately not built —
use multiple vaults instead).

## License

MIT. See [LICENSE](./LICENSE).